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Abstract
We investigate properties of ABA+, a formalism that ex-
tends the well studied structured argumentation formalism
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with a preference
handling mechanism. In particular, we establish desirable
properties that ABA+ semantics exhibit. These pave way
to the satisfaction by ABA+ of some (arguably) desirable
principles of preference handling in argumentation and non-
monotonic reasoning, as well as non-monotonic inference
properties of ABA+ under various semantics.
1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen a number of non-
monotonic reasoning (NMR) formalisms advanced (see
e.g. (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2008a) for an
overview). Since preferences are ubiquitous in common-
sense reasoning, there has been a considerable effort to
integrate preference information within NMR formalisms
(cf. e.g. (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2008b;
Delgrande et al. 2004; Domshlak et al. 2011;
Kaci 2011)). To evaluate distinct formalisms, var-
ious properties of both non-monotonic inference
and preference handling have been proposed, see
e.g. (Makinson 1988; Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990;
Brewka and Eiter 1999; Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Sˇimko 2014).
Meanwhile, argumentation (as overviewed in
(Rahwan and Simari 2009)) has become an established
branch of AI widely used for NMR (see e.g. (Dung 1995;
Bondarenko et al. 1997; Modgil and Prakken 2013)).
Broadly speaking, information in argumentation is repre-
sented via arguments, while attacks among them indicate
conflicts. Procedures, known as argumentation semantics,
are employed to select extensions, i.e. sets of collectively
acceptable arguments. Preferences in argumentation also
play a significant role (cf. e.g. (Simari and Loui 1992;
Kaci 2011)), by allowing to, for instance, discrimi-
nate among arguments or extensions. Over the years,
numerous formalisms of argumentation with prefer-
ences have been presented (see Section 7) and some
∗This is a revised version of the paper presented at the work-
shop.
properties for argumentation with preferences indi-
cated (e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Modgil and Prakken 2013; Amgoud and Vesic 2014;
Dung 2016)).
NMR properties are also adaptable to argumen-
tation setting. For example, the well known non-
monotonic inference properties of Cautious Monotonic-
ity and Cumulative Transitivity (cf. (Makinson 1988;
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990)) concern what hap-
pens when a conclusion reached through a reasoning process
is added to the knowledge base to reason with anew. These
properties have been cast with respect to extensions in argu-
mentation, in e.g. (Cˇyras and Toni 2015; Dung 2016).
Preference handling properties for NMR can be phrased
in terms of extensions in argumentation too. For instance,
the well known Principle I from (Brewka and Eiter 1999)
regarding preferred answer sets can be applied to argu-
mentation semantics thus: if two extensions E1 and E2
coincide except for two arguments A ∈ E1 \ E2 and
B ∈ E2 \ E1 such that A is preferred over B, then E2
should not be chosen as a ‘preferable’ extension. Like-
wise, a common property of NMR says that, in the ab-
sence of preference information, a formalism extended
with a preference handling mechanism should return the
same extensions as the preference-free version of the for-
malism (see e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Sˇimko 2014)).
In this paper, drawing from the above mentioned
works, we investigate various properties of a recently
proposed NMR formalism ABA+ (Cˇyras and Toni 2016a).
ABA+ extends with a preference handling mechanism a
well established argumentation formalism, Assumption-
Based Argumentation (ABA) (Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Toni 2014). Whereas a common way to approach
preferences in argumentation is to use preference
information to discard the attacks from arguments
that are less preferred than the ones they attack (see
e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003;
Kaci and van der Torre 2008; Brewka et al. 2013;
Besnard et al. 2014)), ABA+ instead reverses such at-
tacks. We show that ABA+’s method of accounting for
preferences satisfies (arguably) desirable properties.
On the one hand, we consider preference han-
dling properties from (Brewka and Eiter 1999;
Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Amgoud and Vesic 2014) and show their satisfaction
under various ABA+ semantics. On the other hand, build-
ing on the investigations of Cumulative Transitivity and
Cautious Monotonicity for ABA (Cˇyras and Toni 2015),
we analyse ABA+ in the light of these non-monotonic
inference properties. In addition, we make use of the
well known principle of Contraposition of rules (see
e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013)) and prove it guarantees
that ABA+ semantics satisfy desirable properties akin
to those in e.g. (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Modgil and Prakken 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give
preliminaries on ABA and ABA+. In Section 4 ABA+ se-
mantics are analysed. Preference handling properties of
ABA+ are studied in Section 5, while Section 6 concerns
ABA+ and non-monotonic inference properties. After dis-
cussing related work (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
We base the following ABA background on (Toni 2014).
Definition 1. An ABA framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯),
where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system with a language L and a set
R of rules of the form ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm with m > 0
and ϕi ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}; ϕ0 is referred to as the
head of the rule, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is referred to as the body
of the rule; if m = 0, then the rule ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is
written as ϕ0 ← ⊤ and is said to have an empty body;
• A ⊆ L is a non-empty set, whose elements are referred to
as assumptions;
• ¯¯¯ : A → L is a total map: for α ∈ A, the L-formula α is
referred to as the contrary of α.
We focus on flat ABA frameworks, where no assumption
is the head of any rule. Flat ABA frameworks are very com-
mon, and capture, as instances, widely used paradigms of
non-monotonic reasoning, such as Logic Programming and
Default Logic (see e.g. (Bondarenko et al. 1997)).
Definition 2. A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L
andR ⊆ R, denoted by S ⊢R ϕ, is a finite tree with the root
labelled by ϕ, leaves labelled by ⊤ or elements from S, the
children of non-leaf nodes ψ labelled by the elements of the
body of some rule fromR with head ψ, and R being the set
of all such rules. For E ⊆ L, the conclusions Cn(E) of E
is the set of elements with deductions supported by S ⊆ E
and some R ⊆ R, i.e. Cn(E) = {ϕ ∈ L : ∃ S ⊢R ϕ, S ⊆
E, R ⊆ R}.
Assumption-level attacks in ABA are defined thus.
Definition 3. A set A ⊆ A attacks a set B ⊆ A, denoted
A  B, if there is a deduction A′ ⊢R β, for some β ∈ B,
supported by some A′ ⊆ A and R ⊆ R. For E ⊆ A, also
called an extension, we say that:
• E is conflict-free if E 6 E;
• E defendsα ∈ A if for allB  {α} it holds thatE  B;
• E is admissible if E is conflict-free and defends all α ∈
E.
The most standard ABA semantics are as follows.
Definition 4. A conflict-free set E ⊆ A is:
• stable, if E  {β} for every {β} ⊆ A \ E;
• complete if E is admissible and contains every assump-
tion it defends;
• preferred if E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• grounded if E is ⊆-minimally complete;
• ideal if E is ⊆-maximal such that E is admissible and
contained in all preferred extensions.
Example 5. Let L = {α, β, α, β}, R = {α ← β} and
A = {α, β}. In (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯), {β} attacks both {α} and
{α, β}, while {α, β} attacks itself and {α}. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ) can
be graphically represented via its assumption framework,
pictured below (in illustrations of assumption frameworks,
nodes hold sets of assumptions while directed edges indi-
cate attacks):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
This (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) has a unique complete extension {β},
which is also grounded, ideal, preferred and stable, and has
conclusions Cn({β}) = {α, β}.
3 ABA+
ABA+ (Cˇyras and Toni 2016a) extends ABA with prefer-
ences as follows.
Definition 6. An ABA+ framework is any tuple
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), where (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) is an ABA frame-
work and 6 is a preorder (i.e. a transitive and reflexive
binary relation) on A.
Differently from e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014; Garcı´a and Simari 2014),
ABA+ considers preferences on assumptions rather than
(defeasible) rules. This is not, however, a conceptual differ-
ence, since assumptions are the only defeasible component
in ABA+.
Unless stated differently, we consider a fixed, but oth-
erwise arbitrary ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), and
implicitly assume (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) to be its underlying ABA
framework. The strict counterpart < of 6 is defined as
α < β iff α 6 β and β 
 α, for any α and β.
ABA+ attack relation is given thus.
Definition 7. A set A ⊆ A of assumptions <-attacks a set
B ⊆ A of assumptions, written as A < B, if:
• either there is a deduction A′ ⊢R β, for some β ∈ B,
supported by A′ ⊆ A, and ∄α′ ∈ A′ with α′ < β;
• or there is a deduction B′ ⊢R α, for some α ∈ A, sup-
ported by B′ ⊆ B, and ∃β′ ∈ B′ with β′ < α.
The first type of attack is called normal, and the second one
reverse.
ABA+ requires a standard ABA attack to be reversed
whenever the attacker has an assumption less preferred than
the one attacked. The following example illustrates.
Example 8. Recall (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) from Example 5. Suppose
β < α. In the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), {β} ‘tries’
to attack {α}, but is prevented by the preference β < α. In-
stead, {α} <-attacks {β}, and likewise {α, β}, via reverse
attack, and the latter <-attacks both itself and {β} via re-
verse attack. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) can be represented graphically
as follows (reverse attacks in assumption frameworks will
be denoted by dotted arrows):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
In contrast with the ABA framework, where {β} is
unattacked and generates an attack on {α}, in the
ABA+ framework, {α} is <-unattacked and <-attacks all
sets of assumptions that contain β. This concords with the
intended meaning of the preference β < α, that the conflict
should be resolved in favour of α.
This concept of <-attack reflects the interplay between
deductions, contraries and preferences, by representing in-
herent conflicts among sets of assumptions while account-
ing for preference information. Normal attacks follow the
standard notion of attack in ABA, additionally, preventing
the attack to succeed when the attacker uses assumptions
less preferred than the one attacked. Reverse attacks, mean-
while, resolve the conflict between two sets of assumptions
by favouring the one containing an assumption whose con-
trary is deduced, over the one which uses less preferred as-
sumptions to deduce that contrary.
The notions of conflict-freeness and defence w.r.t.  <,
and ABA+ semantics are given as follows.
Definition 9. For E ⊆ A we say that:
• E is <-conflict-free if E 6 < E;
• E <-defends α ∈ A if for all B  < {α} it holds that
E  < B;
• E <-defends A ⊆ A if for all B  < A it holds that
E  < B; and
• E is <-admissible if E is <-conflict-free and <-defends
E.
In Example 8, ∅, {α} and {β} are conflict-free in
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) and<-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), whereas
{α, β} is not (<-)conflict-free in either framework.
Definition 10. A <-conflict-free extension E ⊆ A is:
• <-stable if E  < {α} for every {α} ⊆ A \E;
• <-complete if E is <-admissible and contains every as-
sumption it <-defends;
• <-preferred if E is ⊆-maximally<-admissible;
• <-grounded if E is ⊆-minimally <-complete;
• <-ideal if E is ⊆-maximal such that E is <-admissible
and contained in all <-preferred extensions.
In Example 8, {α} is a unique <-stable, <-complete, <-
preferred,<-grounded and <-ideal extension.
Henceforth, we assume σ ∈ {stable, complete, preferred,
grounded, ideal} and use <-σ to denote any ABA+ seman-
tics.
We recall several features that ABA+ possesses and that
will be used later.
Lemma 1. Let A′ ⊆ A ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A be given. If
A′  < B
′, then A < B.
Lemma 2. For any A,B ⊆ A:
• if A B, then either A < B or B  < A;
• if A < B, then either A B or B  A.
4 Properties of ABA+ Semantics
To ensure that the familiar relations between semantics
carry from ABA over to ABA+, we want to guaran-
tee the so-called Fundamental Lemma (Dung 1995;
Bondarenko et al. 1997) (see below). To this end, we
follow the well established structured argumenta-
tion formalism ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014) and impose the principle of
Contraposition, reformulated for ABA+ as follows.
Axiom 11. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of Contra-
position if for all A ⊆ A, R ⊆ R and β ∈ A it holds that
if A ⊢R β, then for every α ∈ A, there is Rα ⊆ R with
(A \ {α}) ∪ {β} ⊢Rα α.
This axiom requires that if an assumption plays a role in
deriving the contrary of another assumption, then it should
contrapositively be possible for the latter to induce a deriva-
tion of the contrary of the former assumption too. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the effect Contraposition has in
ABA+.
Example 12. Let R = {β ← α, γ}, A = {α, β, γ} and
α < β, α < γ. (The language and the contrary map-
ping are implicit from R and A.) This ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) does not satisfy the Axiom of Contraposi-
tion. Its assumption framework (omitting ∅,A and<-attacks
to and from A) is shown below:
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
There are no extensions under, for instance, <-complete se-
mantics, because all the singletons {α}, {β} and {γ} are
<-unattacked, but {α, β, γ} is not <-conflict-free.
If the rules α ← β, γ and γ ← α, β are added to R
to constituteR′, then the resulting (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies
the Axiom of Contraposition and its assumption framework
looks as follows (<-attacks that are both normal and reverse
are depicted as solid directed edges):
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
Here, {β, γ} is a unique<-complete extension.
We prove next that in the presence of Contraposition, the
Fundamental Lemma is guaranteed to hold in ABA+.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom
of Contraposition. Let S ⊆ A be <-admissible and assume
that S <-defends α, α′ ∈ A. Then S ∪ {α} is <-admissible
and <-defends α′.
Proof. Note that if α ∈ S, then S ∪ {α} is trivially <-
admissible. So assume α 6∈ S and suppose for a contradic-
tion that S ∪ {α} is not <-admissible. Then it is either not
<-conflict-free, or does not <-defend itself. Suppose first
S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α} via either (1) normal or (2) reverse
attack. We show that either leads to a contradiction.
1. S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α} via normal attack. As S is <-
conflict-free and<-defendsα, this<-attack must involve α.
I.e. S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β for some S′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α},
and ∀s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} we find s′ 6< β. If β = α, then S′ ∪
{α} < {α}, and so S  < S
′ ∪ {α}. Else, if β ∈ S′, then
S′ ∪ {α} < S, and so S  < S′ ∪ {α} as well. We show
that we can similarly obtain S  < S
′ ∪{α} in case (2) too.
2. S∪{α} < S∪{α} via reverse attack. As in 1., this<-
attack must involve α, i.e. S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β for some S′ ⊆ S
and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} such that s′ < β. If
β ∈ S, then S  < S′∪{α}. Else, if β = α, then s′ 6= α (by
asymmetry of<), and using the Axiom of Contrapositionwe
findA ⊢R
′
s′ forA ⊆ (S′∪{α})\{s′}, so that S′∪{α} 
S. Then, by Lemma 2, either S′ ∪ {α}  < S or S  <
S′ ∪ {α}, which yields S  < S′ ∪ {α} in any case.
In either (1) or (2), S  < S
′ ∪ {α}, and as S is <-
conflict-free and<-defends α, this<-attack must be reverse
and involve α: A1 ∪ {α} ⊢R1 s1, s1 ∈ S, A1 ⊆ S′, and
∃s′1 ∈ A1 with s
′
1 < s1. Without loss of generality take
s′1 to be 6-minimal such. By the Axiom of Contraposition,
there is S1 ∪ {α} ⊢R
′
1 s′1 with S1 ⊆ (A1 \ {s
′
1}) ∪ {s1}
and ∀x ∈ S1 x 6< s′1 (by 6-minimality of s
′
1). That is,
S1 ∪ {α}  < A1, so we find S  < S1 ∪ {α}, again via
reverse attack involving α: A2 ∪ {α} ⊢R2 s2, s2 ∈ S,
A2 ⊆ S1, and ∃s′2 ∈ A2 with s
′
2 < s2. We again im-
pose 6-minimality on s′2 and by the Axiom of Contrapo-
sition get S2 ∪ {α} ⊢R
′
2 s′2, S2 ⊆ (A2 \ {s
′
2}) ∪ {s2} and
∀x ∈ S2 x 6< s′2.
As deductions are finite and< asymmetric, the procedure
described above will eventually exhaust pairs of s′k ∈ Ak
and sk ∈ Sk such that s′k < sk, so that S  < Sk ∪{α} will
have to be a normal attack, for some k. But this leads to a
contradiction to S being <-admissible and <-defending α.
Hence, by contradiction, S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free.
We now want to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself. So
let B  < S ∪ {α}. As S is <-admissible and <-defends
α, we consider this <-attack to be reverse and involving α:
S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β1, S′ ⊆ S, β1 ∈ B, and ∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α}
with s′ < β1. By the Axiom of Contraposition, S1 ⊢R
′
1
s′, S1 ⊆ ((S′ ∪ {α}) \ {s′}) ∪ {β1}. Thus, S1  {s′},
whence S ∪ {α}  < S1. This <-attack cannot be normal
on (S′ ∪{α}) \ {s′}, due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪{α};
while, if it is normal on β1, then S∪{α} < B, as required.
Else, S ∪ {α}  < S1 via reverse attack: B1 ⊢R1 s1, s1 ∈
S ∪ {α}, B1 ⊆ S1, and ∃s
′
1 ∈ B1 with s
′
1 < s1. Due
to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, we find β1 ∈ B1. Then
again, by the Axiom of Contraposition, we find S2 ⊢R
′
2 s′1,
S2 ⊆ (B1 \ {s
′
1}) ∪ {s1}, and β1 ∈ S2. Like with the proof
of <-conflict-freeness, this process must terminate with a
normal attack S ∪ {α}  < B, so that S ∪ {α} eventually
<-defends itself.
Finally, given that S <-defends α′ to begin with, using
Lemma 1 we conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends α′ too.
For the rest of this section, we assume that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition.
We can now define the <-defence operator Def, inspired
by (Dung 1995).
Definition 13. Def : ℘(A) → ℘(A) is defined as follows:
for A ⊆ A, Def(A) = {α ∈ A : A <-defends α}.
By Lemma 1, Def is monotonic: if A ⊆ B ⊆ A, then
Def(A) ⊆ Def(B). Hence, Def has a unique least fixed
point, which is in addition a unique <-grounded extension
of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), as shown next.
Proposition 4. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a unique <-
grounded extension.
Proof. First, observe that ∅ is <-admissible in
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). The least fixed point G can be given
as
⋃
i∈N Def
i(∅). By Lemma 3, G is <-admissible. It
is clearly <-complete (as G = Def(G)) and unique ⊆-
minimal such (as the least fixed point). Hence,G is a unique
<-grounded extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
As a consequence of Proposition 4, we get the following.
Corollary 5. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a <-complete exten-
sion.
Using Lemma 3, we can prove the following results.
Proposition 6. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a <-preferred exten-
sion.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the collection of <-admissible super-
sets of ∅ is partially ordered by subset inclusion ⊆, so any
sequence ∅ ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An ⊆ . . . of <-admissible
sets of assumptions (for n an ordinal) has an upper bound
A =
⋃
i>0 Ai. Then A ⊆ A is <-admissible: if it were
not <-conflict-free, then some An would not be either; and
for any B  < A we have B  < An, for some n, so that
An  < B, and hence A  < B too. Since every chain
∅ ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An ⊆ . . . admits an <-admissible upper
bound, every such chain has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible
set of assumptions, according to Zorn’s Lemma. As ∅ is <-
admissible, (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits at least one⊆-maximally
<-admissible—i.e. a <-preferred—extension.
Proposition 7. Every <-preferred extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is a <-complete extension too.
Proof. Let E be a <-preferred extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
and suppose for a contradiction that it is not <-complete.
Let E <-defend some α ∈ A \ E. As E is <-admissible,
E∪{α} is<-admissible, by Lemma 3. But then E is not⊆-
maximally <-admissible, contrary to E being <-preferred.
Hence, by contradiction,E must be <-complete.
Further, as in ABA, <-stable semantics is subsumed by
both<-preferred and<-complete semantics, as shown next.
Proposition 8. Any<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-preferred extension too.
Proof. Let E be a<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). As
E <-attacks every {β} * E, it must be ⊆-maximally <-
admissible. Hence, E is <-preferred.
Proposition 9. Any<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-complete extension too.
Proof. LetE be a<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). For
any β 6∈ E, <-stability of E means that E  < {β}, and if
E <-defended β as well, it would mean that E  < E, con-
tradicting its <-conflict-freeness. Hence, E contains every
assumption it <-defends, and so is <-complete.
Finally, we consider<-ideal semantics.
Proposition 10. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a unique <-ideal
extension.
Proof. From Proposition 6 we know that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) ad-
mits<-preferred extensions, so let S be their intersection. If
S = ∅, then it is <-admissible, and so an <-ideal exten-
sion (unique). If S 6= ∅ is <-admissible, then it is an <-
ideal extension (unique as well). Else, assume S 6= ∅ is not
<-admissible. Then its ⊆-maximally <-admissible subsets
I ( S are <-ideal extensions of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). Suppose
I and I ′ are two distinct <-admissible subsets of S. Then
their union I ∪ I ′ is a subset of S too, and so <-conflict-
free. By Lemma 3, I ∪ I ′ <-defends its assumptions, so
must be <-admissible. Consequently, there can be only one
⊆-maximally<-admissible subset of S, i.e. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
has a unique<-ideal extension.
Proposition 11. Any<-ideal extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-complete extension too.
Proof. By Proposition 10, it has a unique <-ideal exten-
sion I . Suppose for a contradiction that I is not<-complete.
Then there is α ∈ A \ I <-defended by I . Such α must be
contained in the intersection S of <-preferred extensions of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), because I ⊆ S <-defends α and every <-
preferred extension E of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is <-complete (by
Proposition 7). But then, I ∪ {α} is <-admissible, accord-
ing to Lemma 3, so that I is not <-ideal—a contradiction.
Therefore, I must be <-complete.
These properties that ABA+ exhibits in the presence of
Contraposition will be used to show, in the coming sec-
tions, that ABA+ satisfies certain principles of preference
handling and non-monotonic reasoning.
5 Preference Handling Properties
Referring to (Amgoud and Vesic 2009), in
(Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010) the authors
hinted at two (arguably) desirable properties of argumen-
tation formalisms dealing with preferences, that concern
conflict preservation and the absence of preferences. In the
next two subsections we indicate that ABA+ satisfies those
properties, and in the following subsections show that other
(arguably) desirable properties of preference handling are
too satisfied by ABA+.
5.1 Conflict Preservation
The first property insists that extensions returned after ac-
counting for preferences should be conflict-free with respect
to attack relation not taking into account preferences. We
formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA+ as follows.
Definition 14. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Con-
flict Preservation for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ ex-
tensions E ⊆ A of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), for any α, β ∈ A,
{α} {β} implies that either α 6∈ E or β 6∈ E.
In (Cˇyras and Toni 2016a) it was shown that Lemma 2
guarantees the following result.
Proposition 12. E ⊆ A is conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) iff E
is <-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
Consequently, ABA+ ensures conflict preservation:
Proposition 13. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Con-
flict Preservation for any semantics <-σ.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), If
α, β ∈ E and {α}  {β}, then {α, β} is not conflict-free,
and hence not<-conflict-free, by Proposition 12. But thenE
is not <-conflict-free either, which is a contradiction. Thus,
either one of α and β does not belong to E.
5.2 Empty Preferences
The second property insists that if there are no preferences,
then the extensions returned using a preference handling
mechanism should be the same as those obtained without
accounting for preferences. We formulate it as a principle
applicable to ABA+ as follows.
Definition 15. Suppose that the preference relation 6
in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is the strict empty ordering ∅. Then
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences
for ∅-σ semantics if for all ∅-σ extensions E ⊆ A of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅), E is a σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯).
In (Cˇyras and Toni 2016a) the following result was shown
to hold.
Theorem 14. E ⊆ A is a σ-extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ) iff E
is an ∅-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅).
This theorem, in addition to saying that ABA+ is a conser-
vative extension of ABA, immediately yields the satisfaction
of the principle in question:
Proposition 15. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅) fulfils the Principle of
Empty Preferences for any semantics ∅-σ.
5.3 Maximal Elements
(Amgoud and Vesic 2014) proposed a property concerning
inclusion in extensions of the ‘strongest’ arguments, i.e. ar-
guments that are maximal w.r.t. preference ordering. We
next reformulate the property to be applicable to ABA+.
Definition 16. Suppose the preference ordering 6 of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is total and further assume that the setM =
{α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is <-conflict-free.
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements
for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), it holds thatM ⊆ E.
As an illustration, in Example 8, α is a unique 6-
maximal element inA, and {α} is a unique<-σ extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), whence (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle
of Maximal Elements for any semantics <-σ.
Our next result shows that in general, ABA+ satisfies this
principle under <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proposition 16. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of
Maximal Elements for <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proof. Let the preference ordering 6 of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) be
total and supposeM = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is
<-conflict-free. We first show thatM is not <-attacked.
Fix α ∈M and suppose for a contradiction that for some
S ⊆ A it holds that S  < {α}. So either (i) ∃B ⊢R α with
B ⊆ S and ∀β ∈ B α 6 β or β 
 α, or (ii) {α} ⊢R β
for some β ∈ S with α < β. Note that the case (ii) cannot
happen, because α is6-maximal. So consider case (i). Since
6 is total, it follows that α 6 β ∀β ∈ B. But as α is 6-
maximal, it must also hold that β 6 α, for any β ∈ B. From
here, we show B ⊆ M . Indeed, fix β ∈ B and assume for
a contradiction that β 6∈ M . Then ∃γ ∈ A such that β < γ.
By transitivity, α < γ, contradicting α’s 6-maximality. So
we must have β ∈M , and consequently,B ⊆M .
But now, since α ∈ M, B ⊆ M and B  < {α}, this
contradicts <-conflict-freeness ofM . Therefore, by contra-
diction, S 6 < {α}, for any S ⊆ A. Since α ∈ M was
arbitrary, we haveM <-unattacked, as required.
If (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits no <-stable or <-complete ex-
tensions, then the principle is fulfilled trivially. Otherwise,
let E ⊆ A be <-stable in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). Pick α ∈ M and
suppose for a contradiction that α 6∈ E. Then E  < {α},
which is a contradiction. Thus, α ∈ S, and henceM ⊆ S.
Now let E be a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
and suppose for a contradictionM * E. Then E does not
<-defend some α ∈M . This means that S  < M for some
S ⊆ A, which is a contradiction. Hence,M ⊆ E.
This principle may, however, be violated under, say,
<-preferred semantics: in Example 12, the framework
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) to begin with, admits {α, β} as a <-
preferred extension, while γ 6∈ {α, β} is a 6-maximal el-
ement. However, assuming Contraposition, the Principle of
Maximal Elements is satisfied under the remaining seman-
tics too.
Corollary 17. If (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of Con-
traposition, then it fulfils the Principle of Maximal Ele-
ments for <-preferred/<-ideal/<-grounded semantics.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4, 7, 11 and 16.
5.4 Principle I
(Brewka and Eiter 2000) formulated a principle for sound
extension-based default reasoning with preferences, which
we reformulate for ABA+ next.
Definition 17. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils Principle I for <-σ
semantics if for all E,E′ ⊆ A such that E = E0 ∪ {α}
and E′ = E0 ∪ {α′} for some E0 ⊆ A, with α, α′ 6∈
E0 and α
′ < α, it holds that if E is a <-σ exten-
sion of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), then E′ is not a <-σ extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
This principle insists that if two coherent viewpoints of a
situation differ only in that each of them contains a single as-
sumption not contained in the other, then the viewpoint with
the more preferred assumption should be chosen. ABA+ sat-
isfies this principle under<-stable semantics.
Proposition 18. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils Principle I for <-
stable semantics.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that both E = E0 ∪ {α}
andE′ = E0∪{α′}, where α′ < α, are<-stable extensions
of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). As E′ is <-stable and α 6∈ E′, we get
E′  < {α}. As E is <-conflict-free, we find E0 6 < {α},
so (from E′  < {α} we get that): (i) either there is E′′ ∪
{α′} ⊢R α with E′′ ⊆ E0 and ε 6< α ∀ε ∈ E′′ ∪ {α′};
(ii) or {α} ⊢R α′ is such that α < α′. As α′ < α, both
cases lead to a contradiction, so that E′ is not a <-stable
extension, provided E is.
In Example 8, E = {α} is a unique<-stable extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), which illustrates the principle as follows:
take E0 = ∅ so that E = {α} and E′ = {β}, where β < α.
It is important that Principle I is satisfied under<-stable se-
mantics, because (Brewka and Eiter 1999) investigated (pre-
ferred) answer sets of logic programs, and answer sets in
Logic Programming correspond to stable extensions in ABA
(Bondarenko et al. 1997). Satisfaction of the principle gives
hope that preferred answer set semantics can be captured in
ABA+, as answer set semantics is captured in ABA.
Principle I, however, may be violated under <-preferred
semantics: in Example 12, (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) has two <-
preferred extensions {α, β} and {β, γ}, and yet α < γ.
Note, though, that (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of
Contraposition and has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}, and
thus fulfils Principle I for any semantics <-σ. Based on our
investigations, we conjecture that assuming Contraposition,
ABA+ frameworks fulfil the principle for the remaining se-
mantics as well. Verifying this is left as future work.
6 Non-Monotonic Reasoning Properties
(Cˇyras and Toni 2015) proposed and studied the well known
non-monotonic inference properties of Cautious Mono-
tonicity (MON henceforth) and Cumulative Transitivity
(CUT henceforth) for ABA. Here, we investigate some of
those properties for ABA+. We first recall (some of) the
properties considered and results obtained.1
Assume as given a fixed, but otherwise arbitrary (flat)
ABA framework F = (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ). Let E be a σ exten-
sion ofF . In what follows,E′ will denote a σ extension of a
newly constructed ABA frameworkF ′. To avoid trivialities,
we consider cases only where each of F and F ′ has at least
one σ extension—E and E′ respectively.
1In (Cˇyras and Toni 2015), instead of sceptical/credulous (see
below) the words strong/weak were used, respectively; we have
altered the names to adhere to the more common terminology.
We first recall the STRICT setting regarding strengthen-
ing of information. Given ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, define F ′ =
(L,R∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯). There are four properties:
SCEPTICAL STRICT CUT :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL STRICT MON :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′);
CREDULOUS STRICT MON :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′).
Table 1 summarizes results pertaining to ABA (sceptical
and credulous versions coincide under grounded and ideal
semantics, and for other semantics the status of the credu-
lous property is indicated in parentheses).
Property Grd. Ideal Stable Pref. Cpl.
STRICT
CUT
X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
STRICT
MON
X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 1: STRICT CUT /MON for standard ABA
We now recall the ASM setting, where conclusions that
are themselves assumptions are being confirmed. Given ψ ∈
Cn(E) ∩ A, define F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A \ {ψ},¯¯).2
The properties are as follows:
SCEPTICAL ASM CUT :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS ASM CUT :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL ASM MON :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′);
CREDULOUS ASM MON :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′).
Table 2 summarizes results regarding ABA in the ASM
setting (notation as before).
Property Grd. Ideal Stable Pref. Cpl.
ASM CUT X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
ASM MON X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 2: ASM CUT /MON for standard ABA
The non-monotonic inference properties CUT and
MON can be readily applied to ABA+. Take F to be an
2For brevity reasons, the same symbol ¯¯¯ is used for both con-
trary mappings, and in the new framework F ′, the contrary map-
ping¯¯¯ is implicitly restricted to a diminished set of assumptions.
ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), let E be its <-σ exten-
sion, and given ψ ∈ Cn(E), define F ′ as follows:
• STRICT setting: F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6);
• ASM setting: F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A \ {ψ},¯¯,6′),
where6′ is a restriction of 6 to A \ {ψ}.
We can then analyse whether the non-monotonic infer-
ence properties in question are satisfied in ABA+. Trivially,
as ABA+ is a conservative extension of ABA (cf. Theo-
rem 14), properties violated in ABA will remain violated
in ABA+. Therefore, we will focus on those that are satis-
fied in ABA; in particular, the credulous versions except for
MON under ideal semantics.
Example 18. As an illustration of the properties, recall Ex-
ample 12. The ABA+ frameworkF = (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) (that
satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition) has a unique<-σ ex-
tension {β, γ} with Cn({β, γ}) = {α, β, γ}.
• STRICT setting: take α and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ←
⊤},A,¯¯,6). ThenF ′ has a unique<-σ extension {β, γ}.
• ASM setting: take β and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {β ← ⊤},A \
{β},¯¯,6′) with α <′ γ. Then F ′ likewise has a unique
<-σ extension {β, γ}.
As conclusions of extensions of both F and F ′ are actually
the same, the credulous versions of the properties are indeed
satisfied in both settings.
In what follows, we assume that a given ABA+ frame-
work F = (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of Weak
Contraposition (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b)), which is a weaker
form of the Axiom of Contraposition.
We first show that ABA+ inherits the behaviour from
ABA with respect to the non-monotonic inference proper-
ties under<-stable semantics.
Proposition 19. F fulfils CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and
CREDULOUS STRICT MON for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let F = (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) be a flat ABA+ framework
satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, let E be a
<-stable extension of F , and let ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A. Define
F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6). Cn and Cn′ will denote
the conclusion operators of, respectively, F and F ′. The <-
attack relations of F and F ′ will be denoted by  < and
 ′<, respectively. We claim that E is a <-stable extension
of F ′.
Suppose for a contradiction that E is not <-conflict-
free in F ′. Then E is not conflict-free in (L,R ∪ {ψ ←
⊤},A,¯¯), by (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5). But then,
as ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) either.
Hence, by (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5), E is not <-
conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus, E is <-
conflict-free in F ′.
Now let β ∈ A \ E be arbitrary. We aim to show that
E  ′< {β}. To this end, as E is <-stable in F , we know
that E  < {β}. We split into cases.
• Suppose E  < {β} via normal attack. Then A ⊢R
β,A ⊆ E,R ⊆ R and ∀α ∈ A α 6< β. If this de-
duction does not involve ψ, then clearly we have A  ′<
{β} via normal attack. Else, we can find A′ ⊆ A and
R′ ⊆ R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤} such that A′ ⊢R
′
β, whence clearly
A′  ′< {β} via normal attack too.
• Suppose E  < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ⊢ ε
for some ε ∈ E such that β < ε. Since β 6∈ E and E is
<-conflict-free, this <-attack does not involve ψ. Hence,
{ε} ′< {β} via reverse attack too.
In any event, E  ′< {β}, as required. Therefore, E is <-
stable in F ′.
Proposition 20. F fulfils CREDULOUS ASM CUT and
CREDULOUS ASM MON for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let F = (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) be a flat ABA+ framework
satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, let E be a <-
stable extension of F , and let ψ ∈ Cn(E)∩A. Define F ′ =
(L,R∪{ψ ← ⊤},A\{ψ},¯¯,6′), where6′ is a restriction
of 6 to A \ {ψ}. Cn and Cn′ will denote the conclusion
operators of, respectively, F and F ′. The <-attack relations
of F and F ′ will be denoted by < and ′<, respectively.
We show that E \ {ψ} is <-stable in F ′.
Suppose for a contradiction thatE\{ψ} is not<-conflict-
free inF ′. ThenE\{ψ} is not conflict-free in (L,R∪{ψ ←
⊤},A\{ψ},¯¯), by (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5). But
then, as ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯).
Hence, by (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5), E is not <-
conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus, E \ {ψ}
must be <-conflict-free in F ′.
Now let β ∈ A \ (E ∪ {ψ}) be arbitrary. We aim to show
that E \ {ψ}  ′< {β}. To this end, as E is <-stable in F ,
we know that E  < {β}.
• Suppose E  < {β} via normal attack. Then A ⊢R
β,A ⊆ E,R ⊆ R and ∀α ∈ A α 6< β. If ψ 6∈ A,
then we have A ′< {β} via normal attack. Else, we find
A\{ψ} ⊢R β, so thatA\{ψ} ′< {β} via normal attack.
• Suppose E  < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ⊢ ε for
some ε ∈ E such that β < ε. If ε 6= ψ, then this <-attack
does not involve ψ, and so we have {ε}  ′< {β} via
reverse attack, where {ε} ⊆ E \ {ψ}. Else, {β} ⊢ ψ and
β < ψ, so the Axiom of Weak Contraposition guarantees
that, in F , we have A ⊢ β for some A ⊆ {ψ}. But then,
in F ′, we find ∅ ⊢ β.
In any event, E \ {ψ} ′< {β}, as required. Therefore,E \
{ψ} is <-stable in F ′. Finally, note that Cn(E) = Cn′(E \
{ψ}).
In general, ABA+ does not inherit all the properties from
ABA. In particular, CUT and MON can in general be violated
in both STRICT and ASM settings under all but <-stable
semantics. The following examples illustrate violations.
Example 19 (STRICT MON violation). Consider F =
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε ← β, x, ψ, α ← β, x, p, β ←
α, x, p, x← x},
• β < α.
This flat ABA+ frameworkF satisfies the Axiom ofWeak
Contraposition. It has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-
preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E =
{p, q, α, ε} with Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ, ε}. Note that {α} <-
defends {ε} from {β, x, p, q} by <-attacking the latter via
reverse attack, due to the rule α ← β, x, p and the prefer-
ence β < α.
ConsiderF ′ = (L,R∪{ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6). In this frame-
work, {ε} is <-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x}, and
no subset of E can <-defend {ε} against this <-attack. In-
deed, F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-
complete (but not <-stable) extension E′ = {p, q, α} with
Cn′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ} + Cn(E). (Here and in further ex-
amples, Cn′ is the conclusion operator of F ′.) Hence, F
does not fulfil STRICT MON under any of the four seman-
tics in question.
Example 20 (ASM MON violation). ConsiderF andE from
Example 19. Let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ← ⊤},A \ {α},¯¯, ∅).
InF ′, {ε} is<-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x, p, q},
and cannot be<-defended by any set not containing x. Over-
all, F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-
complete (but not <-stable) extension E′ = {p, q} with
Cn′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ} + Cn(E). Hence, F does not fulfil
ASM MON under any of the four semantics in question.
Example 21 (ASM CUT violation). Consider F =
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε ← β, x, ψ, α ← β, x, p, β ←
α, x, p, x← x, ψ ← ⊤},
• β < α.
So F is simply F ′ from Example 19. It satisfies the
Axiom of Weak Contraposition and we know that it has
a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but
not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α} with Cn(E) =
{p, q, α, ψ}. Let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {p ← ⊤},A \ {p},¯¯,6
). In F ′, given that p is a fact, the <-attacker {β, x} of
{ε} is <-attacked by {α} via reverse attack. Thus, {α}
<-defends {ε}, and so E′ = {q, α, ε} with Cn′(E′) =
{p, q, α, ψ, ε} * Cn(E) is a unique<-grounded/<-ideal/<-
preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension of F ′.
This shows that F does not fulfil ASM CUT under any of
the four semantics in question.
Example 22 (STRICT CUT violation). Consider F =
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) with
• A = {α, β, p, q, ε, x},
• R = {ψ ← p, q, ε ← β, x, ψ, α ← β, x, y, y ←
p, β ← α, x, p, x← x, β ← α, x, ψ ← ⊤},
• β < α.
(So, in contrast to the framework from Example 19, there is
an intermediate non-assumption y deducible from {p} and
replacing p in the rule α← β, x, p; we also have ψ as a fact,
and the rule β ← α, x will be needed for Weak Contraposi-
tion in the framework F ′ after the change.)
F satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition and has
a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but
not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α} with Cn(E) =
{p, q, α, ψ, y}. Let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {y ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6).
(Since inF ′ we have the deduction {β, x} ⊢{α←β,x} αwith
β < α, the rule β ← α, x guarantees that F ′ satisfies the
Axiom of Weak Contraposition.) Similarly to Example 21,
{α} <-defends {ε}, and F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-
ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension
E′ = {p, q, α, ε} with Cn′(E′) = {p, q, α, ψ, y, ε} *
Cn(E). Hence, F does not fulfil STRICT CUT under any
of the four semantics in question.
Table 3 summarizes this section’s results (sceptical and
credulous versions coincide under <-grounded and <-ideal
semantics; for other semantics the credulous version is indi-
cated in parentheses.)
Property <-g. <-id. <-stb. <-pr. <-cpl.
STRICT/ASM
CUT
X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
STRICT/ASM
MON
X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 3: (STRICT and ASM) CUT and MON for ABA+
7 Related and Future Work
The principle of Contraposition of (strict)
rules (see e.g. (Caminada and Amgoud 2007;
Modgil and Prakken 2013)) is notably employed
in the well studied structured argumentation
formalism ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014). The principle as such is also in-
herently present in classical logic-based approaches to struc-
tured argumentation such as (Gorogiannis and Hunter 2011;
Besnard and Hunter 2014). Similarly as in ASPIC+,
ABA+ utilizes Contraposition to ensure the Fundamental
Lemma (cf. Lemma 3). As a consequence, Contrapo-
sition paves way to satisfaction of desirable properties
of ABA+ semantics, as well as preference handling as
discussed in Section 5. Whether the Axiom of Contrapo-
sition can be relaxed for ABA+ to obtain the same results
is a line of future research. So far we know only that a
particular relaxation, namely the Axiom of Weak Contra-
position (Cˇyras and Toni 2016b), changes the behaviour of
ABA+ with respect to non-monotonic reasoning properties,
as discussed in Section 6.
The preference handling principle discussed in Section
5.4 was originally proposed, along with some other prop-
erties, by (Brewka and Eiter 1999) for answer set program-
ming (ASP) with preferences. To the best of our knowledge,
reformulation of Principle I for ABA+ is the first application
of this principle to argumentationwith preferences. Building
on (Brewka and Eiter 1999), (Sˇimko 2014) discussed an ex-
tended set of principles for ASP with preferences, most of
which focus on preferences over rules. Whether those prin-
ciples can be applied to ABA+ is a future work direction.
Regarding preference handling in argumentation, along
with the Principle of Maximal Elements discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3, (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) suggested several ar-
guably desirable properties of argumentation with prefer-
ences. Those properties are exhibited in ABA+ as Propo-
sition 12 and Theorem 14. Referring to those proper-
ties, (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010) also hinted
at other properties regarding selection among extensions, as
possible principles of preference handling in argumentation.
Relating those principles to ABA+ is left for future work.
In terms on non-monotonic reasoning properties,
Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity
(studied in Section 6) are traced to (Makinson 1988;
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) and fall into the
well studied area of analysing non-monotonic reasoning
with respect to information change (cf. (Rott 2001)).
In argumentation setting, the latter is also known as
argumentation dynamics, and has recently been a
topic of interest in the argumentation community (see
e.g. (Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr, and Lagasquie-Schiex 2010;
Falappa et al. 2011; Baroni et al. 2014;
Coste-Marquis et al. 2014; Booth et al. 2014;
Diller et al. 2015; Baumann and Brewka 2015)). In
particular, non-monotonic inference properties were
investigated in (Hunter 2010) with respect to argument–
claim entailment in logic-based argumentation systems;
in (Cˇyras and Toni 2015) for ABA; and with regards to
ASPIC+-type-of argumentation systems in (Dung 2016).
Only the latter of the three works concerns argumentation
with preferences. In addition to considering different
structured argumentation setting and different preference
handling mechanisms, it diverges from our analysis in
Section 6 in that (Dung 2016) regards Cumulative Transi-
tivity plus Cautious Monotonicity as a single property of
Cumulativity and studies it only for stable and complete
semantics. Other argumentation-related properties from
(Dung 2016) will be studied for ABA+ in the future.
Several other topics of interest are left for future
work. For instance, integrating dynamic preferences
(see e.g. (Zhang and Foo 1997; Prakken and Sartor 1999;
Brewka and Woltran 2010)) within ABA+ and study-
ing their interaction with the properties of prefer-
ence handling as well as of non-monotonic infer-
ence. Also, relation of ABA+ to Logic Program-
ming with preferences (e.g. (Sakama and Inoue 1996;
Zhang and Foo 1997; Brewka and Eiter 1999)) and
non-monotonic reasoning formalisms equipped
with preferences in general (e.g. (Brewka 1989;
Baader and Hollunder 1995; Rintanen 1998;
Brewka and Eiter 2000; Delgrande and Schaub 2000;
Stolzenburg et al. 2003; Kakas and Moraitis 2003)) is left
for future research.
There are as well numerous approaches to in-
tegrating reasoning with preferences within ar-
gumentation, e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002;
Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre 2008;
Modgil 2009; Modgil and Prakken 2010;
Baroni et al. 2011; Dunne et al. 2011; Brewka et al. 2013;
Amgoud and Vesic 2014; Besnard and Hunter 2014;
Garcı´a and Simari 2014; Wakaki 2014;
Modgil and Prakken 2013; Modgil and Prakken 2014;
Dung 2016). It would be interesting to study these for-
malisms with respect to the properties considered in this
paper, where it has not already been done. We leave this as
future work.
8 Conclusions
We investigated various properties of a recently
proposed non-monotonic reasoning formalism
ABA+ (Cˇyras and Toni 2016a) that deals with prefer-
ences in structured argumentation. In particular, we first
established that assuming the principle of Contraposition
(see e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013)), ABA+ semantics
exhibit desirable properties akin to those of other existing
argumentation formalisms, such as (Dung 1995). We then
showed that ABA+ satisfies some (arguably) desirable
principles of preference handling in argumentation and
non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. (Brewka and Eiter 1999).
Finally, we analysed non-monotonic inference properties
(as in (Cˇyras and Toni 2015)) of ABA+ under various
semantics. We believe our work contributes to the under-
standing of preferences within argumentation in particular,
and in non-monotonic reasoning at large.
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